Deontology

[Matthew Hale] was no reformer: nothing better than an expounder: every thing stated by him was stated as he found it, or conceived it to be: no inquiries as to what it ought to be: in the eyes of lawyers—not to speak of the dupes—that is to say, as yet, the generality of non-lawyers—the is and the ought to be (or, as in Greek it would be so much better—the το ον and the το δεον, from which last, Ethics has received the more expressive name of Deontology), were one and indivisible.

The principle, then, on which Deontology is grounded, is the principle of Utility; in other words, that every action is right or wrong—worthy or unworthy—deserving approbation or disapprobation, in proportion to its tendency to contribute to, or to diminish the amount of public happiness.

And then she discoursed with voluble blandiloquence on deontologies and morals, and pondered with imposing gravity on ancient lores, and wisdoms, and beatifications, and in all her countenance seemeth as demure as a babe asleep.

[T]he main concern of the last two hundred and fifty years or so of ethics has been to assess the morality of actions or rules by themselves – act-and-rule utilitarianisms and deontologies – as opposed to an interpretation of actions within a morality of being.

William Frankena has altered [Charlie Dunbar] Broad's distinction slightly to define teleology as making consequences the "one and only … ultimate right-making characteristic" and to define deontology as allowing "that there are other considerations that may make an action or rule right or obligatory besides the goodness or badness of its consequences …"[…].

Deontologies that arise from status functions are not morally neutral. This is in part because of familiar issues such as that people are likely to rely on the observance of such deontologies, the wrongfulness of freeriding, and so on.