Phenomenalness

[I]n that apprehension of self which Mr Ferrier justly lays down as at the root of knowledge, the self apprehended is not merely the same thing as the self apprehending, in which case the process would be unimportant: the apprehending the apprehended self is the clothing it with various predicates (then, indeed, first understood), among them locality (corporealness or phenomenalness).

A Semitic verb, in which accordingly is but the phantom of an implied nominative held suspended!—the Divine assertion of an “i am that i am,” in which, however, is so the pronoun suppressed, as that rightly is the actual mere phenomenalness of the Universe, as revealed to us, and not any real absoluteness of it, at all sought to be represented:—only that which is mere Motion and E-motion, rightly figurable by the mere verb, being presumed to be included in the “name.”

I therefore will not make my views known, in an intellectual sense—other than to say that I’m ready to make known the view that I don’t think of making views known as being intellectual work or an intellectual gesture. Because, as we see, such making known of views can only pose a temptation and a really unpleasant dilemma for the one on whose behalf that intellectual type has made his views known! But it’s something else entirely if this same type, in a moment of some incomprehensible courage, were to come out against one or another individual and one or another phenomenon whose phenomenalness comes directly from that individual.